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George Robertson’s claims about the prime minister’s “corrosive complacency” over Britain’s safety made headlines. But it is a howl of pain, not a sober security analysis. The former Nato secretary general and author of the government’s strategic defence review (SDR) wants Downing Street to back his view of Britain’s role in the world – as Robin to America’s Batman – with billions of pounds of cash. But his argument takes for granted what should be under scrutiny: Britain’s global military role itself.

Donald Trump’s threats over Greenland, his disregard for international law and his U-turn over the Chagos deal expose the fragility of Britain’s defence assumptions. Before spending billions, those commitments must be re-examined. Lord Robertson’s claim of a £28bn black hole assumes that the current strategy is the correct one. But if that strategy – with its emphasis on global deployment and alliance commitments – is open to question, then the funding gap may reflect overstretch rather than insufficient spending.

The world is a dangerous place. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Iran war and China’s rising power make for unsettling times. But the calculation within Whitehall seems to be that Britain is not at any serious imminent risk. That is why a rise in military spending is promised – but with most of the increase delayed until the 2030s. The peer is understandably furious that current defence expenditure plans – which are subject to the chancellor’s self-imposed restraints – remain underfunded and unresolved.

The intervention is designed to force the government’s hand to commit – fiscally and politically – to a defence model that sees Britain as America’s junior partner. Rather than strategic autonomy or European partnership, Lord Robertson wants the UK’s forces built to assist the US. That fits with Britain’s purchase last year of 12 American F-35A jets that can carry nuclear bombs. That was not about expanding Britain’s own nuclear capability – over which it has political but not technological control. It is about participating more fully in Nato’s nuclear sharing arrangements, using US-controlled weapons. Calls for more spending without retrenchment can prop up an outdated global posture.

Lord Robertson produced his first SDR as Tony Blair’s defence secretary in 1998, and the historian David Edgerton noted then that Britain was committing itself “to acting primarily with the USA in a wide-ranging programme of global policing”. The structure of the armed forces is designed not for autonomous defence but because “the composition … is what allows Britain to be the USA’s principal partner”. Only 15% to 20% of spending, Prof Edgerton reckoned, related to purely national defence. In that sense, the model Lord Robertson now defends was never primarily about defending the UK at all. It was about plugging into a US system and piggybacking on its arms industry base.

The Treasury is right to question prioritising defence now. Cutting welfare would hit demand and weaken growth. As Khem Rogaly of the Common Wealth thinktank argues, defence spending provides a weak economic stimulus compared with public investment – and is even worse as a job creator. Moreover, the UK is not using higher defence spending to build its own independent military, but to reshape its armed forces around a US-style venture capital and tech ecosystem. With Mr Trump in office, there is no better time to ask: whose security are we funding – Britain’s or America’s?